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The aim of this paper is to o⁄er a more appropriate test of Kuznets￿
￿inverted-U￿hypothesis than the one routinely used in the literature and
implement it using panel and country-by-country regressions. We explore
whether countries experiencing large shifts in population from the agri-
cultural/rural sector to the urban one are characterized by an evolution
of income inequality along the lines discussed by Simon Kuznets in its
classical article. Our results show that there is no systematic relationship
between income inequality and agricultural employment or rural popula-
tion.
1 Introduction
In an enormously in￿ uential article, Kuznets (1955) speculated that income
inequality should ￿rst rise and then fall as countries progress from low to high
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1development status. This ￿inverted U￿ hypothesis became one of the most
widespread notions in development economics. During subsequent decades, no
discussion of income inequality seemed to be complete without a mention of
Kuznets￿hypothesis. At its zenith, researchers in the area of income inequality
referred to it as a "stylized fact" (Adelman and Robinson 1989) or an "economic
law" (Robinson 1976).
Kuznets￿thinking was clearly embedded in the dominant notions of eco-
nomic development of the 1950s. At this time, development and industrializa-
tion were used largely as synonyms, and the process of economic development
was universally seen as the process which transfers labor from a ￿traditional￿ ,
low productivity, rural sector (agriculture) to a "modern", high productivity,
urban sector (industry). This line of thought guided much policy making in
multilateral aid-agencies, international organizations and developing country
governments1. Our aim here is not to evaluate the pros and cons of this way of
understanding economic development but rather to make the obvious point that
Kuznets￿hypothesis can only be understood within the intellectual framework
that produced it.
Kuznets￿thesis was that as population shifts from the traditional to the
modern sector income inequality would ￿rst rise and then fall, thus describing
an "inverted-U" trajectory. In his own words:
1The main in￿uence of this line of tought was Lewis￿(1954) model of a dual economy. Two
good discussions of Kuznets￿hypothesis and how it relates to the intellectual environment of
its time are Kanbur (2000) and Moran (2005).
2One might thus assume a long swing in the inequality charac-
terizing the secular income structure: widening in the early phases
of economic growth when the transition from the pre-industrial to
the industrial civilization was most rapid; becoming stabilized for a
while; and then narrowing in later phases. (Kuznets 1955, p.18)
Kuznets sustained his point with a simulation exercise where population
shifted from a low income sector to a high income one and noted the changes as
this happened2. Simulations and mathematical proofs aside, the best argument
in favour of Kuznets￿hypothesis might be its intuitive appeal. It is not di¢ cult
to visualize the initial and ￿nal stages of the developmental process as charac-
terized by a low level of inequality: we start when everyone is a traditional farm
labourer and we end when everyone is a modern urban worker. The interme-
diate stages would be characterized by higher inequality due to the di⁄erence
between urban workers and farm labourers.
The shift of population from Agriculture to modern industries is central to
Kuznets￿hypothesis, as it is the mechanism that gives the inverted U a meaning
and makes Kuznets￿contribution a theory of the evolution of income inequality
and not just a black-box guess. It follows that a test of Kuznets￿hypothesis
should try to measure whether population shifts from agriculture to other sectors
are related in any systematic way to income inequality. This, however, is not
2More rigorous modellings of the process and of its e⁄ects on inequality were provided by
Robinson (1976) and Anand and Kanbur (1993). A "Kuznets curve" is also a feature of more
complex models of economic development with additional features such as Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1998) or Glomm and
Ravikumar (1998).
3what the very large empirical literature on Kuznets￿hypothesis has done over
the last ￿ve decades.
As is well known, tests of Kuznets￿hypothesis search for a relationship be-
tween income per capita and inequality. The econometric method, the measures
of inequality and income per capita, and of course the spatial and time cover-
age of the analysis change; but all the empirical studies we are aware of take
as granted that regressing measures of inequality on income per capita is the
way to test for Kuznets￿hypothesis. Here we propose an alternative to this
widespread and largely unchallenged view.
One way to gain insight into the question is to step back and ask ourselves
why do we think inequality and income per capita are related. The answer
would be Kuznets￿account of the development process. But in Kuznets￿account
the driving mechanism is the structural transformation of the economy from
agriculture to modern sectors. This is what is causing both changes in inequality
and changes in income per capita. It follows that to test this mechanism we
should be direct and search for a relationship between the structure of the
economy and inequality.
Another way to express the above is to say that since inequality and income
per capita are driven by a common cause (i.e. the structural transformation of
the economy), there is correlation but not causality between them. In econo-
metric terms, the regression of inequality on income per capita su⁄ers from an
endogeneity biais since a regressor (income per capita) is correlated with an
4omitted variable (the structural transformation of the economy) which is the
true driving factor of inequality.
Moreover, income per capita also presents the inconvenient of being a⁄ected
by many other factors besides the structural change in the economy: think of
capital accumulation, technological change or the discovery of natural resources.
If income per capita is changing for any of these reasons, how will income in-
equality evolve? There is no easy answer to this last question, and Kuznets￿
hypothesis does not deal with it.
This paper distinguishes itself by taking the mechanism proposed by Simon
Kuznets seriously and testing whether changes in the employment structure of
an economy can be related to income inequality in any systematic way. The
most appropriate measure for our study is the share of the population employed
in agriculture, and falls in this share would be interpreted as advances along
the developmental path. A close, though not perfect, substitute would be the
share of the population living in rural areas. The empirical section of this paper
will use these two measures of the employment structure of the economy as
alternative explanatory factors of income inequality.
A second contribution of the present paper is the approach we take to deal
with the important problems of data comparability in the area of income in-
equality. As we explain in section 3, measures of income inequality are typically
not directly comparable across countries or, for a given country, across time.
The solution we propose is to group the data in series in such a way that all
5observations within a series are mutually comparable. Within-series variability
can then be used to estimate the e⁄ect of explanatory variables.
The result of our empirical analysis is that, both on a panel of countries
and on a country by country framework, Kuznets￿hypothesis is not supported
by the data. Kuznets￿hypothesis should therefore be regarded as an attractive
idea that is simply not true.
2 Econometric tests of Kuznets￿hypothesis
Researchers have looked for a relationship between income per capita and in-
equality using one of the following three econometric approaches: (i) Cross-
country regressions (looking for a relationship across countries observed at a
given moment in time), (ii) Panel regressions (looking for a relationship across
countries and across time), (iii) Country by country regressions and case stud-
ies (looking for a relationship across time in a single country or in a group of
countries taking each country separately).
Of these three, only the last one is fully acceptable, the second one is tolerable
and the ￿rst one is completely inadequate. Due to data restrictions, the ￿rst
approach dominated tests of the Kuznets hypothesis until the 1990s3. The
problem with cross-country regressions in this context is that they implicitly
assume not only that the relationship between income per capita and inequality
3Examples are Ahluwalia (1976), Anand and Kanbur (1993b), Dawson (1997), Paukert
(1973)
6is the same for all countries but also, and more problematically, that all other
factors a⁄ecting inequality are either non-existent or constant across countries.
Fundamentally, Kuznets￿hypothesis describes what happens to a country over
time. Testing it in a cross-section is considering that all countries in the world
are images of each other at di⁄erent developmental stages. One can try to
remedy this problem by introducing some controls, like dummies for di⁄erent
continents, but results tend to be not robust to this type of exercises.
A panel regression is a superior approach since it allows to control for all
time-invariant country characteristics by the inclusion of ￿xed e⁄ects. This ap-
proach has been used in the more recent empirical studies, specially since the
publication of the extensive dataset of Deininger and Squire (1996)4. The down-
side of testing Kuznets￿hypothesis with a panel regression is that we assume
that income per capita a⁄ects inequality in the same way in all countries. It
is not di¢ cult to envisage problems with this assumption. Even if we limit
our thinking to the mechanisms presented by Kuznets (1955), the particular in-
verted U pattern would di⁄er across countries if parameters such as the average
income in each sector and the within-sector inequality are not the same in all
countries.
The last possibility, studying each individual country separately, is the only
one that is fully consistent with the spirit of Kuznets￿hypothesis. Only by
following a given country along its development path can we say if it experienced
4Examples of panel regressions of inequality are Barro (2000), Deininger and Squire (1998),
Frazer (2006), Higgins and Williamson (1999), Li et al. (1998) or Matyas et al. (1998).
7an increase and subsequent fall in income inequality as a result of this process.
This approach is also the most demanding in terms of data since it requires a
number of observations over a relatively long period of time for each country
we want to study. This is why most work in this category are case studies
of developed countries, for example the analysis of the evolution of income
inequality over the last three centuries in Britain and the United States by
Lindert (2000) or the study of the evolution of inequality in European countries
by Morrisson (2000). With the notable exception of Deininger and Squire (1998),
we can think of no paper applying this methodology over a large number of
developing countries.
We test whether the proportion of the population of a country living in urban
areas is related to income inequality ￿rst with a panel regression and then with a
country by country regression approach. While both methodologies point to the
same conclusion, we consider that the country by country regressions provide
the most convincing evidence.
3 Data selection and methodology
Our evaluation of Kuznets￿hypothesis requires data on the structure of the
economy and data on income inequality. Our two measures of the structure of
the economy are the share of population employed in agriculture and the share
of population living in rural areas. The source for these two measures is the
World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators (Edition 2006). The number of
8observations and country coverage for the population employed in agriculture
is quite restricted for developing countries, and for all countries the earliest
observation refers to 1980. This is not a severe problem when using a panel
regression since the large number of countries provides enough variability, but
it does make a country by country approach very di¢ cult. For this reason we
will also use the share of the population living in rural areas as a proxy for the
employment in agriculture. For this second variable we have a balanced panel
with 46 yearly observations (1960-2005) for each of the 226 countries and regions
included in the World Bank￿ s dataset. Clearly, not all of those living in rural
areas are employed in agriculture and the de￿nition of what constitutes a rural
area might be problematic. These caveats notwithstanding, the two variables
are highly correlated (0.72) and most regression results continue to hold when
we change one variable for the other. The data on income inequality presents
more delicate problems, to which we turn to next.
Our source for income inequality data is the World Income Inequality Data-
base version 2.0, published by the World Institute for Development Economics
Research at the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER). This is the largest
secondary database on income inequality available and contains, among many
other sources, the work of Deininger and Squire (1996), diverse estimates made
by the World Bank and the data from numerous national statistical agencies.
The full database contains over four thousand observations of Gini coe¢ cients
for most countries in the world, mainly over the last ￿ve decades.
9Before turning to the empirical work we must address the important com-
parability problems that exist when using secondary datasets in general and
datasets of income inequality in particular (see Atkinson and Brandolini 2001,
Atkinson and Bourguignon 2000). For a given distribution of income, a measure
of inequality can vary greatly according to the choices made in a large number
of dimensions: (a) The reference unit (household, family, tax unit, person), (b)
The equivalence scale used (if any), (c) The income de￿nition (income, con-
sumption, earnings, expenditure, monetary income and whether it is a gross or
a net quantity. This without mentioning the many items that can be included
or excluded in any de￿nition of income), (d) The weighting of each observa-
tion (same weight to each observation or weighting by the number of household
members), (e) The population covered (all population, income earners, taxpay-
ers), (f) The age coverage (all ages, persons in age of working, persons above
a certain age), (g) The treatment of very low incomes (reported as zero) and
of very high incomes (reported as the lower limit of the top income band) and
so on. Di⁄erent researchers make di⁄erent choices, so their estimates are not
directly comparable.
The solution to this problem is not to control for each underlying character-
istic of the observation by using dummy variables (that is, using a dummy for
each type of income, for each reference unit, and so on); and this for at least two
reasons. First, it is impossible to control for everything as some choices made
in the construction of the inequality measure are not speci￿ed in the dataset.
One can ￿nd several cases where two or more observations that refer to the
10same country, the same year and with identical reported characteristics still
take di⁄erent values. The explanation is simply that these observations have
been calculated by di⁄erent researchers making di⁄erent choices that are not
speci￿ed in the dataset.
The second problem is that using dummy variables in this way assumes
that the di⁄erence between, say, Gini coe¢ cients calculated on income and
Gini coe¢ cients calculated on consumption is equal across all countries. This
assumption is clearly inadequate, as shown by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001)
who compare Gini coe¢ cients for OECD countries calculated from gross and
net income, or with and without an equivalence scale. Even though the data
they use is highly comparable (all estimates come from the same source: the
Luxembourg Income Studies), they found that the di⁄erences between gross and
net income observations or between observations that use an equivalent scale
and those that do not are anything but constant across countries. The distance
between observations range from 1 Gini point to 6 Gini points, according to the
country. The potential for error is therefore considerable.
Our view is that an error of a couple of Gini points is tolerable if our aim is to
explain inequality di⁄erences between countries. In this case we are concerned
with di⁄erences of 20 Gini points or more, like the ones that exist between
Latin American and European countries, and a couple of Gini points would not
bias the results too much. The same is not true, however, if we are interested
in explaining inequality changes for a given country over time. In most cases
11income inequality changes very slowly over time, maybe 4 or 5 Gini points over
several decades, so that an error of a couple of Gini points is very large and can
bias our results completely.
To deal with this issue we proceed as follows. First, we group observations
in what we will call "series". A series is a set of observations over time referring
to the same country, coming from the same source and where the same choices
have been made in all relevant dimensions (reference unit, income de￿nition
and so on). Once this is done, we control for the level of each series and use
the within-series variability to estimate the e⁄ect of explanatory factors. The
idea is that we can con￿dently compare within-series observations. Within a
given series we ￿nd not only that all reported characteristics are the same, but
unreported characteristics should also be constant since all observations come
from the same source. Moreover, we allow for the di⁄erence between (say)
income-based Gini coe¢ cients and consumption-based Gini coe¢ cients to vary
across countries.
To control for the level of each series our empirical work will include ￿xed
e⁄ects for each individual series. This implies that any single-observation series
will be dropped from the exercise: they have no within-series variation to be
exploited; their single observation would be used to estimate their own ￿xed
e⁄ect.
After this data selection procedure we have a total of 2752 observations
of inequality grouped in 551 series and corresponding to 121 countries, for an
12average of 4.55 series and 22.74 observations per country5.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Panel regressions
We start by grouping all countries together and using a panel data approach to
investigate whether a relationship exists between the structure of the economy
and income inequality. The empirical speci￿cation we use is the following:




￿i + "i;t (1)
In equation (1) the subscript t indexes time and the subscript i indexes series.
Ii;t is our measure of income inequality, the Gini coe¢ cient. The variable xi;t is
one of our two measures of the structure of the economy. In order to obtain an
inverted U relationship we need to use a variable that, according to Kuznets,
would be positively related to inequality at the beginning of the development
process and negatively related towards its end. This is why we use the "Share of
population employed outside agriculture", which is simply one minus the share
of population employed in agriculture, as our ￿rst choice of xi;t: Similarly, our
second choice is just the share of population living in urban areas and equals one
minus the share of population in rural areas. The ￿i are the series-speci￿c ￿xed
5Besides the selection procedure described here, we have also excluded observations that
refer only to urban or rural areas, observations whose quality rating is "unreliable" and obser-
vations from years before 1960 (the data for our explanatory variables start in 1960 so these
observations would be dropped from the regressions anyway).
13e⁄ects, N is the number of series and "i;t is an error term uncorrelated with
the regressors. All regressions include the series-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects but their
estimates are not reported in the tables of results. We note that the presence or
absence of a "Kuznets￿curve" will be given by the values taken by parameters ￿1
and ￿2: An inverted-U relationship corresponds to a positive ￿1 and a negative
￿2: A "non inverted U" relationship would correspond to a negative ￿1 coupled
with a positive ￿2: Other combinations would yield monotonic relationships
between x and I:
The results of estimating equation (1) in di⁄erent panels of countries are
shown in table 1 (using the Population employed outside Agriculture) and in
table 2 (using the Population living in urban areas). The ￿rst column of these
two tables present our baseline regression, when all countries are taken together.
With the population employed in Agriculture as the regressor the signs of the
coe¢ cients correspond to a non inverted U relationship, and they are both
statistically signi￿cant. When we use the urban population as regressor the
signs of the two coe¢ cients still denote a non inverted U but this time they
are statistically not signi￿cant. Thus, when all countries are taken together the
results do not support Kuznets￿hypothesis.
A look at the R2 coe¢ cient of this regression reveals that most of the vari-
ation of the endogenous variable is being explained (95% in table 1, 94% in
table 2). This high explanatory power is common for panel regressions of in-
14equality and is due to the presence of the ￿xed e⁄ects6. If the ￿xed e⁄ects are
not included and we estimate a single intercept for all countries the explana-
tory power of the regression falls to 8:8% when using the population employed
outside Agriculture and to 4% when using urban population (not shown in the
tables). We interpret this as additional evidence against Kuznets￿hypothesis:
x and x2 are only marginally relevant to explain the variation in the data.
All other columns in tables 1 and 2 repeat the exercise in diverse sub-groups
of countries. The second column investigates the possibility that Kuznets￿hy-
pothesis characterizes only developing countries by excluding high income coun-
tries from the sample. We use the World bank￿ s de￿nition of high income coun-
tries, which includes not just Western Europe, North America and Japan but
also countries such as Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and many small states.
In table 1 we note that the relationship among developing countries is still a
non inverted U, but this time the parameters are statistically not signi￿cant.
The same regression in table 2 shows this time an inverted U relationship, but
only one of the two parameters is signi￿cant. The evidence continues to be
inconclusive.
The remaining columns of tables 1 and 2 group countries by geographical
location. Once again we use the World Bank￿ s de￿nitions to create these groups.
The limitations of the data on employment in agriculture start to show up here,
6Deininger and Squire (1998) obtain an R2 coe¢ cient of 0.9294 while Matyas et al. (1998)
obtain 0.8425 and 0.932 according to the sample. In these two studies the e⁄ects are country-
speci￿c, not series-speci￿c as here.
15since we are not able to perform an estimate for sub-Saharan Africa and there
are very few observations for the regions "Middle East and North Africa" and
"South Asia". When we use the data on urban population we encounter no
such problems. Table 1 shows that, when using employment in agriculture,
we ￿nd an inverted U relationship in two regions (though none is statistically
signi￿cant) and a non inverted U relationship in three regions (two of which
are statistically signi￿cant). When using urban population our ￿ndings are
two inverted U relationships (one of them signi￿cant), three non inverted U
relationships (one signi￿cant) and one monotonously positive relationship (not
signi￿cant). Support for Kuznets￿hypothesis remains thus elusive. It is also
noticeable that in most cases the signs of the coe¢ cient are maintained when
we change one measure of the structure of the economy for the other one.
Overall, the evidence from country groups seems inconclusive and in all
regressions most of the explanatory power comes from the presence of ￿xed
e⁄ects. As we explained earlier, panel regressions are not the ideal setting for
testing Kuznets￿hypothesis and we should not put too much con￿dence in the
results of this methodology. It could be the case that each individual country
satis￿es Kuznets￿hypothesis and evolves along its own inverted U path, but
when we take all countries together no universal pattern emerges. Country-
by-country regressions are thus preferable in this context and we turn to them
next.
164.2 Country by country regressions
The speci￿cation we intend to estimate for each country is exactly as equation
(1). Keep in mind that i indexes series, so we simply have to select all series
from the country under study. Since data availability is a more pressing problem
here we will use urban population as our standard regressor and present results
with employment in agriculture for the few cases where it￿ s possible.
Regressions should not be blindly applied to all countries where the number
of observations allows for it. A problem we must be aware of is that testing
Kuznets hypothesis in a given country requires that some signi￿cant degree of
structural transformation takes place in that country over the period of obser-
vation. In other words, it would be erroneous to use a country where the urban
population changes by, say, 5% over the period of analysis. The data availabil-
ity problem is thus compounded by the fact that we need not just countries
where urban population increases considerably; but countries where inequality
observations exist over the period when urban population is increasing.
Table 3 provides a list of countries ordered by the change in urban population
over the period of observation of inequality. The table shows the ￿rst and last
year when inequality is observed, the share of urban population in those two
points in time and the increase in the urban ratio between them. We include
in this list all countries where the change in urban population is at least 12%.
There are 32 countries that satisfy this condition and these are the ones we will
17use in our empirical exercise7. A change of 12% is a rather small value, the
type of process described by Kuznets would probably require changes of two or
three times that ￿gure. We set the limit this low because very few countries
experience large changes in their urban ratios and have measures of inequality
during that time. A limit of 20% would reduce the number of countries to 12
and a limit of 30% would just leave three countries.
We estimate equation (1) separately for each country and group the countries
in table 4 according to the results of these regressions. Most countries ￿t in
one of the following four cases: countries with an inverted U relationship and
statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients, countries with a non inverted U relationship
and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients, and the two corresponding cases with
non signi￿cant coe¢ cients. We have also marked with a star the countries whose
change in urban population is above 20% over the period of observation.
The evidence in table 4 clearly refutes the existence of a Kuznets￿curve as
an empirical regularity. For 25 of the 32 countries the relationship between
urban population and inequality is not statistically signi￿cant, showing that as
a general rule these two variables are not clearly related. Of the remaining 7
countries, 4 present a statistically signi￿cant inverted U and 3 a statistically
signi￿cant non inverted U relationship.
Moreover, the 4 countries with a statistically signi￿cant inverted U relation-
ship are all high income countries (Greece, Spain, Netherlands and France) and
7One additional country, Botswana, also satis￿es this condition but the number of obser-
vations available for it are not su¢ cient to carry a regression.
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are certainly not cases that we would use to defend Kuznets￿hypothesis. In
fact, the countries that one would think of as good candidates for Kuznets￿
hypothesis, i.e. large developing countries experiencing important rural-urban
migration such as Brazil, Turkey, China or Mexico, do not show an inverted
U relationship at all. Korea may be the closest case since it experienced much
change over the period of observation and its estimates would be signi￿cant at
the 10% level. But it is practically the sole case that one could use in support
of Kuznets￿hypothesis, against many other countries contradicting it.
If we concentrate only on those countries with a change in urban popula-
tion greater than 20% the evidence against Kuznets￿hypothesis becomes more
marked. Out of these 12 countries only 3 present an inverted U relationship and
this relationship is statistically non signi￿cant in all 3 cases. Thus, the countries
o⁄ering the most appropriate conditions for testing Kuznets￿hypothesis tend to
reject it more strongly.
Finally, we have repeated this country by country exercise using employment
in Agriculture as the explanatory variable and report the results in table 5. The
number of countries is reduced to 20 and there are less observations per country
but the general outcome remains the same. Half of the countries present inverted
U relationships and half non inverted U relationships. The majority of them,
17 out of 20, are not statistically signi￿cant.
195 Conclusion
This paper provides a test of Kuznets hypothesis that is both di⁄erent and su-
perior to the numerous tests that can be found in the literature. As we have
argued, the driving factor behind Kuznets￿mechanism is the progressive shift of
labour from agriculture to "modern" sectors as countries develop. An empirical
assessment of Kuznets￿hypothesis should then concentrate on the relationship
between employment in agriculture and the level of income inequality. This is
precisely the approach we have taken here. Analyzing the relationship between
income per capita and inequality, as the rest of the literature does, might be
an interesting question by itself but is an inferior approach to test Kuznets￿
hypothesis. A relationship between income per capita and inequality can be
the outcome of some development process other than shifts in sectorial em-
ployment, but empirical papers typically do not make such links and cite only
Kuznets (1955) as their theoretical sustain. Our approach is focused on this
particular mechanism stressed by Simon Kuznets and not on some unidenti￿ed
and systematic e⁄ect of the growth of income on its distribution.
Our results are conclusive: there is no systematic relationship between the
share of labour employed in agriculture and the level of income inequality in a
country. We obtain this result both when considering all countries together in
a panel regression or when analyzing each country separately. Inequality has
simply failed to change in any impressive way in the very numerous developing
nations that have experienced large shifts in the employment of its population
20throughout Latin America, Africa and Asia.
The work of Simon Kuznets has been one of the most in￿ uential in Economics
in general and in the study of income distribution in particular. He opened a
whole new avenue of research by making us think of the way in which the distrib-
ution of income can change as countries develop. His insights into this area were
numerous and are still very worth reading today. But the particular hypothe-
sis relating shifting sectorial employment and inequality, the most cited part of
Kuznets￿work in income inequality, should now be de￿nitely abandoned. This
has arguably already been done by many in the profession (see Moran 2005),
but the ghost of the inverted U continues to appear persistently in development
textbooks and academic papers.
Our view is that Kuznets￿curve should be dismissed, but not Kuznets￿ideas
and even less Kuznets￿careful and insightful approach to the question. It would
be, however, a disappointing fact if Kuznets￿curve passed from glory to oblivion
without ever having been tested with the appropriate variables that its under-
lying mechanism suggests. We believe we have remedied this in the present
paper, and hope to have o⁄ered this ingenious and attractive hypothesis the
proper farewell it deserves.
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-0.1295 0.4189  -2.9272  -0.6931  -61.0133 
 
3.3428 
p-value 0.0  0.4276 0.0241 0.0 0.0452 0.2675  0.3181







0.0005 -0.0029  0.0189  0.0050  0.3220 
 
-0.029 
p-value 0.0  0.6743 0.1044 0.0 0.0339 0.2604  0.3954
              
              
              
R
2  0.9586 0.9575 0.9396 0.8883 0.9412 0.9916  0.8389
Number of 
observations 1583  784 200 963 270 11  24
Number of 
series 374  228 57 201 79 4  10






































                
Urban 
Population -0.0487 0.2759 0.8766 -0.8556 -0.5364 -0.9016  0.1200 0.4830
p-value 0.5706  0.0282 0.0 0.0001 0.0803 0.1956  0.7932 0.6256
        
( Urban 
Population)
2  0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0093 0.0070 0.0044 0.0080  0.0015 -0.0055
p-value 0.1402  0.1297 0.0 0.0 0.0631  0.1307  0.9006 0.6934
                
                
                
R
2  0.9420 0.9429 0.9185 0.8634 0.9144 0.7521  0.7932 0.8355
Number of 
observations 2602  1442 336 1417 402  48  112 132
Number of 
series 534  357 71 261 103  16  24 45
                
 Table 3 













rate, year 0 
 
Urbanization 





          
Korea 1961  1998  28.64  79.04  50.4 
Brazil 1960  2001  44.9  81.8  36.9 
Bulgaria 1960 2002  37.1  69.34  32.24 
Turkey 1968  2000  36.6  64.7  28.1 
Philippines 1961  2000 30.56 58.5 27.94 
Malaysia 1970 1999 33.5  60.56  27.06 
Costa Rica  1961  2000  34.6  59  24.4 
Puerto Rico  1963  1989  48.7  71.6  22.9 
Mexico 1963  2002  53.26  75.22  21.96 
China 1964  2003  17.28  38.56  21.28 
Indonesia 1976 1999  19.86  40.72  20.86 
Japan 1962  1998  44.82  64.96  20.14 
Morocco 1960 1991  29.3  49.1  19.8 
Nigeria 1971  1996  21.8  40.38  18.58 
Botswana 1986 1994  29.74  47.58  17.84 
Bangladesh 1963  2000  5.76  23.2 17.44 
Greece 1960  2001  42.9  58.84  15.94 
Finland 1966  2003  45.18  61.1  15.92 
Bahamas 1973 1993  69.94  85.46  15.52 
Spain 1965  2002  61.3  76.46  15.16 
Colombia 1970 2000 56.6 71.2  14.6 
Venezuela 1976  2000 76.52 91.1  14.58 
Ukraine 1968  2002  53.12  67.38  14.26 
Poland 1960  2002  47.9  61.86  13.96 
Israel 1961  2001  77.62  91.44  13.82 
Dominican Rep.  1976  1998  46.82  60.56  13.74 
Netherlands 1977  2001  63.8 77.48 13.68 
Tunisia 1975  2000  49.9  63.4  13.5 
Hong Kong  1966  1996  86.66  100  13.34 
Belarus 1981  2002  57.56  70.88  13.32 
Panama 1989 2000  53.54  65.8  12.26 
France 1962  2002  63.98  76.16  12.18 
Chile 1968  2000  73.8  85.9  12.1 
          
 Table 4 
Country by country regressions using urban population as explanatory factor. 
 
Country  Urban 
population 








            
Inverted U relationships, statistically significant 
Greece  4.867 0.009 -0.048 0.011  0.947 25  4 
Spain  10.086 0.000 -0.073 0.000  0.922 55  14 
Netherlands 5.778 0.001 -0.040 0.001  0.908 45  6 
France  8.933 0.006 -0.071 0.003  0.986 27  5 
            
Inverted U relationships, statistically non significant 
Korea*  0.786 0.096 -0.009 0.066  0.474 31  8 
Puerto  Rico* 0.069 0.985 -0.002 0.939  0.787 10  4 
Japan*  1.639 0.278 -0.016 0.262  0.698 31  4 
Morocco  3.406 0.390 -0.042 0.433  0.945 6  2 
Nigeria  2.448 0.621 -0.035 0.634  0.875 16  6 
Bahamas  29.271 0.052 -0.179 0.057  0.744 10  3 
Ukraine  1.476 0.910 -0.013 0.902  0.586 36  8 
Dominican 
Republic  1.940 0.529 -0.021 0.462  0.856 11  4 
Belarus  4.768 0.099 -0.038 0.086  0.944 35  7 
            
Non inverted U relationships, statistically non significant 
Brazil*  -0.808 0.720 0.006 0.676  0.234 37  8 
Bulgaria*  -0.543 0.698 0.006 0.646  0.840 63  9 
Turkey*  -1.425 0.346 0.010 0.441  0.949 11  5 
Malaysia*  -0.279 0.717 0.002 0.797  0.740 18  6 
China*  -0.028 0.982 0.020 0.346  0.808 32  6 
Indonesia*  -1.089 0.184 0.017 0.214  0.809 19  4 
Bangladesh -1.418 0.133 0.067 0.048  0.655 29  7 
Finland  -4.906 0.061 0.044 0.070  0.876 96  7 
Venezuela  -9.878 0.075 0.060 0.072  0.933 51  9 
Poland  -12.208  0.058 0.107 0.059  0.828 74  14 
Israel  -12.585  0.237 0.080 0.207  0.795 14  3 
Tunisia  -1.077 0.638 0.007 0.731  0.860 7  2 
Hong  Kong -52.184  0.207 0.283 0.219  0.680 10  4 
Panama  -0.906 0.743 0.008 0.722  0.631 15  4 
Chile  -12.164  0.294 0.077 0.269  0.779 39  8 
            
Non inverted U relationships, statistically significant 
Philippines* -1.820 0.001 0.021 0.001  0.811 33  8 
Costa  Rica* -2.168 0.007 0.021 0.009  0.614 28  6 
Mexico*  -3.258 0.012 0.028 0.007  0.673 55  14 
            
Monotonous relationship, statistically non significant 
Colombia  -0.061 0.996 -0.004 0.970  0.826 25  8 
            
 
 Table 5 




Country  Urban 
population 








            
Inverted U relationships, statistically significant 
Netherlands 178.561  0.005 -0.931 0.005 0.909 43  6
            
Inverted U relationships, statistically non significant 
Korea 0.363  0.889 -0.005 0.777 0.717 15  6
Brazil 3.164  0.565 -0.018 0.622 0.694 30  7
Bulgaria 22.540  0.101 -0.149 0.092 0.893 36  7
Philippines 3.583  0.418 -0.029 0.459 0.773 23 7
Mexico 55.416  0.126 -0.344 0.127 0.821 14  6
Japan 34.287  0.321 -0.181 0.330 0.935 10  3
Greece 3.011  0.416 -0.022 0.366 0.749 11  3
Spain 0.247  0.915 -0.002 0.869 0.915 47  13
Poland 2.039  0.632 -0.009 0.744 0.898 66  13
            
Non inverted U relationships, statistically non significant 
Turkey -0.358  0.950 0.001 0.988 0.988 6  3
Malaysia -7.149  0.105 0.047 0.104 0.894 12  5
Costa Rica  -7.080  0.309 0.047 0.306 0.914 23  6
China -0.249  0.874 0.009 0.644 0.697 15  4
Venezuela -24.625  0.162 0.140 0.166 0.935 46  8
Israel -61.013  0.268 0.322 0.260 0.992 10  3
Dominican 
Republic -59.685  0.124 0.363 0.124 0.850 7 3
Panama -3.939  0.354 0.026 0.346 0.661 15  4
            
Non inverted U relationships, statistically significant 
Finland -23.376  0.000 0.134 0.000 0.976 85  7
Chile -50.802  0.002 0.310 0.001 0.745 37  7
            
 
 